




After the date of a contract for the sale of a house, and before completion of the
purchase, the house was damaged by fire, and the vendors received the insurance
money from the insurance company under a policy existing at the date of the con-
tract. The contract contained no reference to the insurance. In an action by tho
purchasers against the vendors : Held, per CoTTON and BRIETT, L.JJ. (dissen-
tiente JA ms, L. J.), that the purchasers were not entitled to recover the moneys
from the vendors, or to be allowed to have the amount deducted from their pur-
chase-money, or to have the moneys applied to reinstatement of the premises.
Per J.xmEs, L. J. The purchasers were entitled to succeed in their action, on
the ground that the relation between the vendors and purchasers became and was,
in law, as from the date of the contract, and up to the completion of it, the relation
of trustees and caetui que trusts, and that the trustees received the insurance money
by reason of and as the actual amount of the damage done to the trust property.
Judgment of JESSEL, M. R., 43 L. T. Rep., N. S. 18, affirmed.
ON the 31st of July 1878, the plaintiffs entered into a contract
with the defendants for the puichase of a house in Liverpool for
the sum of 31001. The house at the time was insured against fire
by the defendants with the Liverpool and Globe Insurance Com-
pany, but the contract contained no reference to this insurance.
Soon after the date of the contract, and before the completion
of the purchase, the house was damaged by fire to the extent of
3001., which sum was paid to the defendants by the insurance
company, who were not then aware of the contract for sale.
The vendors (who were trustees under a will), refused either to
hand over the money to the purchasers or to expend it in rein-
stating the premises, and the purchasers then brought this action.
JESSEL, M. R., considering himself bound by authority, held,
that in the absence of express provision in the contract, the pur-
chasers were not entitled, as against the vendors, to the benefit of
the insurance money, either by way f abatement of the purchase-
money or in reinstatement of the premises. (43 L. T. Rep. N.
S. 18), and plaintiff appealed.
COTTON, L. J.-It was contended by the appellants that they
were entitled to the moneys, 1, on general principles, irrespective
of any special circnmstances alleged to exist in this case ; 2, under
the provisions of the Act of 14 George III., ch. 78, either alone
or with the aid of the special circumstances of this case. On the
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first point, it was urged that, although the contract did not men-
tion the policy, it gave the plaintiffs, as purchasers, a right to all
contracts, to the benefit of which the vendors were entitled, and
of which the execution would be beneficial to or improve the thing
purchased. This was inconsistent with one of the conditions on
the back of the policy, which stipulated that assigns of the pro-
perty, with certain exceptions (not including a purchaser), should
not be entitled to the benefit of the insurance. But, indepen-
dently of that objection, I am of opinion that the contention of
the appellants cannot prevail. The contract passes all things
belonging to the vendor appurtenant to, or necessarily connected
with, the use and enjoyment of the property mentioned in the
contract, but not, in my opinion, a collateral contract, and such,
in my opinion at least, independently of the Act of George III.,
the policy of insurance is. It i not a contract limiting or affect-
ing the interest of the vendors in the property sold, or affecting
their right to enforce the contract for sale. For it is conceded
that, if there were no insurance and the buildings sold were burnt,
the contract for sale would be enforced. It is not even a contract
in the event of a fire to repair the building, but a contract, in that
event, to pay th6 vendor a sum of money which, if received by
him, he may apply in any way he thinks fit. It is a contract not
to repair the damage to the building, but to pay a sum, not exceed-
ing the sum insured, as the money value of the injury. In my
opinion, the contract of insurance is not of such a nature as to
pass, without apt words, under a contract for sale of the thing
insured. But the appellants' case was put in another way. It
was said that a vendor is, between the time of the contract being
made and being completed by conveyance, a trustee of the pro-
perty for the purchaser, and that as, but for the fact of the legal
ownership of the building insured being invested in him, he could
not have recovered on the policy, he must be considered as a
trustee of the money recovered. I think that this cannot be main-
tained. An unpaid vendor is a trustee in a qualified sense only,
and is so only because he has made a contract which a court of
equity will give effect to by transferring the property sold to the
purchaser, and, so far as he is a trustee, he is so only in respect
of the property contracted to be sold. Of this the policy is not a
part. A vendor is in no sense a trustee for the purchaser of rents
accruing before the time fixed for completion, and here the fire
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occurred, and the right to recover the money accrued before the
day fixed for the completion. The argument that the money is
received in respect of property which is trust property, is, in my
opinion, fallacious. The money is received by virtue or in respect
of the contract of insurance, and though the fact that the insured
had parted with all interest in the property insured would be an
answer to the claim, on the principle that the contract is one of
indemnity only, this is very different from the proposition that the
money is received by reason of his legal interest in the property.
It remains to be considered whether the statute of 14 Geo. III.,
ch. 78, can give the plaintiffs any right to the money. In my
opinion the statute does not, of itself, so connect the money with
the land sold as to entitle the plaintiffs successfully to contend that,
under the contract, they are entitled to the money.' * * *
BRETT, L. J., delivered a concurring opinion.
JAMss, L. J.-I am unable to concur in affirming the judgment
of the Master of the Rolls. According to my view of the case,
the plaintiffs' contention is founded, not only on what I may call
the natural'equity which commends itself to the general sense of
the lay world not instructed in legal principles, but also on the
artificial equity as it is understood and administered in our system
of jurisprudence. I am of opinion that the relation between the
parties was truly and strictly that of trustee and cestui que trust.
I agree that it is not accurate to call the relation between the
vendor and purchaser of an estate under a contract, while the con-
tract is in fieri, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust. But
that is because it is uncertain whether the contract will or will not
be performed, and the character in which the parties stand to one
another remains in suspense as long as the contract is infieri.
But when the contract is performed by actual conveyance, or per-
formed in everything but the mere formal act of sealing the en-
grossed deeds, then that completion relates back to the contract,
and it is a thing ascertained that the relation was throughout that
of trustee and cestui que trust. That is to say, it is ascertained
that, while the legal estate was in the vendor, the beneficial or
equitable interest was wholly in the purchaser. And that is, in
I The rest of the opinion being upon the statute, is omitted as Trot of general
interest.
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my opinion, the correct definition of a trust estate. Whenever
that state of things occurs, whether by act of the parties or by
.act or operation of law, whether it is ascertained from the first or
after a period of suspense and uncertainty, then there is a com-
plete~and perfect trust. The legal owner is and has been a trus-
tee, and the beneficial owner is and has been a cestui que trust.
This being the relation between the parties, I hold it to be an uni-
versal rule of equity rhat any right which is vested in a trustee,
any benefit which accrues to a trustee from whatever source or
under whatever circumstances, by reason of his legal ownership of
the property, that right and that benefit he takes as trustee for the
beneficial owner. If the policy of insurance in this case were a
collateral contract, such as the policy which a creditor effects on
the life of his debtor, the case would be wholly different. But a
policy of fire insurance is not, in my opinion, a collateral contract;
it is not a wagering contract-a contract that if a fire happened,
then a certain sum of money shall be paid to the insurer-but it
is, in terms and in effect, a contract that, if the property is injured,
the insurance company will make good the actual damage sustained
by the property. That damage, and that damage only, gives the
right, and is the measure of the right, and it seems to me impossi-
ble to say that it is not, by reason of the legal ownership, and in res-
pect solely of the injury done to that legal ownership, that the right
to recover from the insurance company accrued to the insurer. If
the fire in this case had happened through the wrongful or negligent
act of a third person, while the contract was in fieri, the legal right
to sue for the damage would be in the vendor; but on the comple-
tion of the contract the purchaser would be entitled to use the name
of the vendor as his trustee, to sue for the damage so sustained;
or, if the damages had actually been recovered in the interval, to
recover the damages from the vendor. And it appears to me that
there is no distinction in principle between this right and the right
of the purchaser to use the vendor's'name in an action on the
contract of indemity against loss by fire, which the policy of
insura-nce is. It is not, in my view of the case, at all material to
consider what would be the case if, after actual conveyance and
during the currency of the policy, a fire had occurred. The vendor
in that case would have no right, as between him and the insurance
office, and the purchaser would have no right of action, because
one of the conditions of the policy excludes it, and, independently
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of that condition the policy would or might, probably, be held not
to run with the land in the hands of the subsequent owner. And
in that case there would not be that which is the foundation of
the right, the legal ownership and right in one person and equita-
ble ownership in another. No doubt it is a mere accident that
there was such a policy, and there was such a right. The pur-
chasers could not have complained if there had been no insurance.
But that has occurred in a great variety of cases in which equitable
rights have arisen. Where there are a creditor, a debtor and a
surety, and the surety finds out that, by something to which he is
not privy and of which he had never heard, somebody else had
become surety, or the creditor had obtained security, the surety
has a right to obtain contribution from such surety, or to obtain
such security as the case may be, and the creditor releasing such
surety or parting with such security, would probably find himself
in considerable peril. In the same city in which this controversy
has arisen, there occurred some time ago a great destruction of
property by reason cf an explosion of gunpowder caused by a fire.
Houses were damaged, not by fire, but by the explosion caused by
a fire in another neighboring place. The insurance office thought
that it was for their interest to be very liberal, and treat the dam-
age from the explosion as a damage from fire within the policies,
and to pay accordingly. This was a mere act of liberality. They
thought it was for their permanent benefit, commercially, to be
liberal, and they were liberal accordingly: Taunton v. -Royal Ins.
Co., 2 Hem. & Mil. 135. I cannot myself doubt that, if a trustee
or a vendor who had become trustee" by the completion of his con-
tract had received the bounty, he would have received it by reason
of his trusteeship, and would have had to give it up to his ceetui
que trust and purchaser. In my view of the case, it is perhaps
unnecessary to refer to the Act of Parliament as to fire insurance;
but the act seems to me to show that a policy of insurance on a
house was considered by the legislature, as I believe it to be con-
sidered by the universal consensus of mankind, to be a 'policy for
the benefit of all persons interested in the property, and it appears
to me that a purchaser, having an equitable interest under a con-
tract of sale, is a person having an interest in the house within the
meaning of the act. I believe that there is no case to be found in
which the liability of the insurance office has been limited to the
value of the interest of the insured in the house destroyed. If a
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tenant for life, having insured his house, has the house destroyed
-or damitged by fire, I have never heard it suggested that the
insurance office could cut down his claim by showing that he
was of extreme old age, or suffering from a mortal disease. In
the case of Collingridge v. Boyal Exc/lanqe Assurance Corporatior,
L. R., 3 Q. B. Div. :73, the vendor recovered the whole amount
of the loss, although it was absolutely certain, having regard
to the solvency of his purchaser, that he would really never
suffer any loss at all, personally or otherwise than as trustee for
such purchaser. Of authority on the subject there is, no doubt,
the express decision of KINDERSLEY, V. C., against the plain-
tiff; but against that there are to be set off the very distinct
opinions of Lord ST. LEONARDS and PARKER, V. C., men of great
knowledge of equity, and of great accuracy and sense in their
dicta. But I prefer to rest my judgment on the fact that the
relation between the vendor and purchaser became, and was in
law, as from the date of the contract, and up to the completion
of it, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, and that the
trustee received the insurance money by reason of, and as the
actual amount of the damage done to the trust property. The
plaintiffs put their case also on the ground of the representations
made to them by the defendants' solicitor and agent. What took
place appears to me to be this: The solicitor said to the pur-
chasers, "I do not know who is entitled, but the vendors are the
only persons who have a legal claim, and I will make the claim
accordingly, whichever is entitled," and the purchaser left the
matter in his hands. Now the purchasers could, at that time,
have applied to the office to compel the money to be laid out in
restoring the building. And I am of opinion that, when the
money was, under these circumstances, obtained from the office,
it reached the vendors' hands, according to the then rights of the
parties, as between them and the insurance office ; that is -to say.
as money which ought to be laid out in reinstating the premises;
or, in other words, as money which the purchasers alone had any
real and substantial interest in.
Upon the first blush this deci sion seems stance, one of the conditions endorsed
scarcely consistent with equity, but the on the policy stipulated that assigns of
particular facts of the case disclose the policy, with certain exceptions (not
grounds for -' decision which, apart including a purchaser), should not be
from general principles, give a special entitled to the benefit of the insurance.
Lomplexion to the case itself. For in- The policy of insurance was, as was
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said by COTTON, L. J., a collateral con-
tract. It was a contract, not to repair
the damage to the building, but to pay
a sum not xceeding the sum insured, as
the money value of the injury.
But is not the vendor, in the interim
between the making of the contract and
its completion by a conveyance, a trustee
of the property for the purchaser ? Lord
Justice COTTON thinks not, an unpaid
vendor being a trustee in a qualified
sense only, i. e., only in respect of the
property contracted to be sold. Of this
the policy is not a part.
The money, be it observed, is received
by virtue of the contract of insurance,
and though the fact that the insured had
parted with all interest in the property
insured would be an answer to the claim,
on the principle that the contract is one
of indemnity only, this, as the Lord
Justice says, is very different from the
proposition that the money is received
by reason of his legal interest in the
property. In the case of Garden v.
Ingram, 23 L. J. Ch. 478, relied on by
the appellants, Lord ST. LEONARDs
(Chancellor), affirming a decree of
KNIGHT BnucE, V. C., declared that
the purchaser from a mortgagee of a
lease was entitled to the benefit of a
policy of insurance effected in pursuance
of a covenant contained in the. lease in
the joint names of the lessor and lessee,
and ordered the defendant, the lessee, to
concur with the landlord in giving a
receipt for the money. But there the
lease contained a provision that any
money recovered on the policy should be
laid out in reinstating the buildings in-
jured by fire. Upon this ground the
decision was based ; and this is the view
of the case expressed by KINDEUSLEY,
V. C., in Lees v. Wtdtele.y, 35 L. J. Ch.
412. See Law Rep., 2 Eq. 143; 35 L.
J. Ch. 412; 14 W. R. 534 ; Lagrane v.
U. if. Ins. (o., 14 L. T.- (N. S.) 472,
V. C. K. This is manifestly very differ-
ent from the state of facts disclosed in
the case before us, there being in
Garden v. Iagram, supra, an express
covenant or provision in the subject-
matter of sale relating to the disposi-
tion of the money recovered under a
policy. Durant v. Friend, 5 Do G. &
Sm. 343, also relied upon by the
appellants, was dictum only, not a de-
cision, and need not, therefore, be fur-
ther considered. In Ahr-ris v. Hia-
rtson, 2 Madd. 268, a remainderman
received the balance of a fund received
by a previous tenant for life, on account
of a policy effected by such tenant for
life, but he did so because the executor
and residuary legatee of the tenant for
life had by his will treated the fund as
appropriated for the benefit of the
remainderman.
Against these there is the direct deci-
sion of KINDERISLEY, V. C., in Poole v.
Adams, 12 W. R. 683; 33 L. J. Ch.
639; 10 L. T. (N. S.) 287.. Also, a
portion of the judgment of Lord ELDox
in Paine v. Ieller, ,6 Ves. 349, quoted
by the Master of the Rolls, which to
some extent supports the view of the
vice-chancellor in the case referred to.
BRETT, L. J., expressed his opinion
that the subject-matter of insurance is a
different thing from the subject-matter
of the contract. The subject-matter of
'insurance may be a house in a fire
policy, or premises in a fire policy; or
may be a ship, or goods, or several
other tlings, in a marine policy. But
the subject-matter of the contract is
money. There was a contract of pur-
chase and sale between ie plaintiffs and
the defendants in respect of the premises
insured, but not with regard to the sub-
ject-matter of the contract, which is
money, and money only.
Lord Justice BRETT deems it wrong
to say that the one is a trustee for the
other, for if the vendor were a trustee
of the property for the vendee, it would
seem to follow that all the product, all
the value of the propecty received by
the vendor, from the time of the making
of the contract, ought to belong to the
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vendee. The Lord Justice thought, with
all deference, that that was not law.
Therefore, he ventured to doubt whether
the one was ever a truAstee for the other.
They are only parties to a contract of
vendor and purchaser, of which the
court of equity will, under certain vir-
cumstances, decree a specific perform-
ance.
But even if the vendor was a trustee
for the vendee, the contract of insur-
ance is not a contract which runs
with the land. It is a mere personal
contract, and unless the contract is
assigned there can be no suit or action
maintained upon it, except between the
original parties to it. At common law,
with regard to marine insurances, it has
always been held that where there is a
policy, and where the subject-matter of
the insurance is sold by contract during
the running of the policy, no interest
under the policy passes unless it is made
part of the contract of purchase and
sale, so that it would be considered in a
court of equity as assigned. In Bowles
v. lnnes, 11 Al. & W. 10, it was decided
that "a person who assigns away his
interest in a ship or goods, after effect-
in a policy of insurance upon them,
and before the loss, cannot sue upon the
policy, except as trustee for the assignee,
in a case where the policy is handed
over to him upon the assignment, or
there is an agreement thrt it shall be
kept alive for his benefit."
Such was the opinion' of both Lord
ABINGaR and Lord WENSLEYDALE.
And QuAiN, J., in the case of -orth of
England Pure Oil Cake Co. v. Archangel
Maritime Insurance Co., Law Rep., 10
Q. B. 249 (1875), lays it down, in
accordance with the treatises of Arnold
and Phillips, that "on the sale of a
thing insured no interest in the policy
passes to the vendee unless at the time
of the sale the policy be assigned either
expressly or impliedly." Such appears
to have always been the rile in courts
of law; and KIuNDESLEY, V. c., seems,
in Lees v. Whiteley, supra, to lay it
down as the well-settled and recognised
rule in courts of equity. The action br
money had and received was always, as
BRETT, L. J., said in thc course of his
opinion, treated at common law as
founded upon equity, and therefore, the
decision in this case, whatever it ought
to be, would be, in his opinion, the
same, whether it should be considered to
be a decision at common law or in
equity.
In Hill v. Cunberland, &c., A'otec-
tion Co. (1868), 59 Penn. St. 474, the
owner of buildings insured them against
fire, and afterwards entered into a con-
tract to sell them. Held, that he had an
insurable interest in the property, not-
withstanding the stipulation in the policy
that if the property "be alienated by
sale or otherwise," or "transferred by
any contract or change of partnership or
ownership," the policy should bb void.
At the time of the loss a portion of the
purchase-money remained unpaid, and
no conveyance had been made. See also
Washington, 6-c., Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32
Aid. 421 (1870), to the same effect.
The vendor in a contract of sale of a
factory and machinery, who retains the
legal title uttil payment of the purchase-
money, has an insurable interest in the
machinery as well as the buildings, and
may procure an insurance upon the pro-
perty itself, and not merely his equitable
interest in it: Wood v. NVorthwestem
Ins. Co., 46 N. Y. 421 (1871).
The vendee bears the losses as well as
the benefits between the dates of pur-
chase and consummation. Greaves v.
Gamble, Leg. Gaz. Rep. I (Pa., 1869) ;
Kitts v. JIassasoit Ins. Co., 56 Barb.
1.77 (N. Y., 1867) ; Hitchcock v. N. T.
Ins. Co., 26 N. Y. 68, and Phelps v.
The Gebhard Fire Ins. Co., 9 Bosw.
404, are authorities on the subject of
transfer of title and assignment of policy,
but have little bearing on the present
case.
The value of the bargain is not the
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measure of damages in an action for
breach of contract, but the actual con-
sideration : Ewing v. Thiompson, 66 Penn.
St. 382 (1878). And if moneys, to
be returned with interest: Hertzog v.
JI.'s Adm'r, 10 Casey 418; Dumars v.
Miller, Id. 319 ; Graham v. G.'s .Ex'rs,
Id. 475.
Thus, the policy of insurance, or the
moneys paid upon a policy of insurance
pending the completion of a contract for
the purchase of the premises insured,
form no subject-matter of the contract
between vendor and vendee, unless
specifically mentioned or clearly implied.
The vendor may require the completion
of the contract on the part of the vendee,
or the vendee may perhaps demand the
return of his deposit, with interest, if
the premises have, in the interim between
the making of the contract and the time
fixed for its completion, been destroyed
or damaged by fire, and no deed has as
yet been executed; unless, indeed,
according to Lord Justice BRETT, the
vendor is not "a trustee of the property
for the vendee" (supra); but lie cannot
demand either their restoration, for such
would not be the identical premises bar-
gained for, nor yet the amount of the
insurance money, for that would relate
to another contract between the vendor
and a stranger which had formed no part
of the contract between vendor and
vendee. Where no deposit has been
paid the measure of damages is the
expenses and trouble incurred by vendee
in endeavoring to procure a title:
Dumars v. Miller, supra; but he cannot,
in addition, recover damages for the loss
of the bargoin: Id.
In the principal case reference is
made to 14 Geo. 3, c. 78. Apart
from the fact that that act embraces
only the metropolitan limits of Lon-
don, it directs the application of the in-
surance money by the insurance com-
panies, " upon the request of any person
or persons interested in or entitled unto
any house or houses, or other buildings
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which may hereafter be burnt down,
demolished or damaged by fire, or upon
any grounds of suspicion that the owner
or owners, occupier or occupiers, or
other person or persons, who shall have
insured the same, have been guilty of
fraud, or of wilfully setting their house,
&c., on fire, to cause the insurance
money, as far as the same will go; to be
laid out and expended towards rebuild-
ing," &c., "unless sufficient security be
given that the insurance money shall be
exbended as aforesaid ;" "or unless the
said insurance money shall be within
sixty days settled and disposed of to and
amongst all the contending parties, to
the satisfaction and approbation of such
insurance office."
A consideration of this act was elimin-
ated from the discussion of the case
before us because no such notice as that
required by the act was given, and no
suspicion of fraud or of arson attached
to the owners or occupiers thereof. And
therefore the act did not apply. Indeed,
it is clear that this statute has no refer-
ence to a mere executory contract be-
tween vendor and vendee, but has for its
object the protection of all those having
existing interests in or ownerships of
the premises, under certain circum-
stances. So far, therefore, it sup-
ports the views taken in the cases before
cited.
In conclusion, a court cannot decree a
specific performance of an impossibility
which accident or the hand of God has
effected. It can at most restore to the
vendee his deposit-money, with interest.
It cainot set up a contract where no
contract existed. How far the insurance
company would be justified in with-
holding the money payable on the policy
must depend entirely upon the teims of
their policy relative to its assignment,
tie projected change of ownership, and
any notices required by them. hut can
have no bearine upon a contract between
vendor and vendee in which the exist-
ence of the policy of insurance is neithei
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expressed or implied, much less itself
assigned or conveyed.
The cases before cited on the subject
of the measure of damages were instances
of parol agreements or contracts for the
sale of lands, &e. ; and, as the court
observed more than once, to acknowl-
edge any other standard of damages
would be to place the whole of the land
in the state at the mercy of parol con-
tracts. This would be virtually to offer
a premium to fraud and perjury, the
very mischief which the Statute' of
Frauds was designed to prevent.
"In England," as was remarked by
WOODWARD, J., in Dumars v. Miller,
supra, " a parol contract would not be
suable at all ;" but, as the same learned
judge observed in Herezog v. Hertzog,
supra, " the 4th seetion of the British
Statute of Frauds, relating to parol
contracts for the sale of land, has been
omitted in the Pennsylvania statute."
The original statute of Charles I. had
no force, proprio vigore, in the colonies,
but each colony adopted or adapted it as
in its wisdom it thought fit. 1f, how-
ever, in parol contracts relating to the
sale of lands, where such are allowed,
the actual consideration alone is the
measure of damages, &fortiori in the
more solemn form of a written contract,
as was judicially remarked in the latter
case, the value of the bargain is not the
measure of such damagcs but the actual
consideration.
The other side of the question yet re-
mains, viz. : What is the measure of
damages to which the vendor is entitled,
the vendee declining to accept a damaged
property, and refusing to complete his
purchase ? We apprehend the same
answer must be given to both parties.
As the vendee bears the losses as well
as the benefits between the dates of the
purchase and consummation (supra),
the vendor can insist upon completion
and the payment of the purchase-money,
or may heover damages for the default.
The measure of damages, however, is
the actual consideration. See Ewing v.
Teas, I Binn. 450; Wilson v. Clarke, 1
W. & S. 554; Ellet v. Paxson, 2 Id.
418; Sedam v. Shaftger, 5 Id. 529;
Hastings v. Eckley, 8 Barr 197. Also,
1 Smith's Laws 397; Sugden on Ven-
dors and Purchasers, 280, and Chitty
on Contracts, vol. i., p. 426 (Am. ed.).
At all events the application of money
received by the vendor, under a policy
of insurance for damage resulting from
fire pending the completion of the con-
tract of sale of such premises, such
vendor being the policy holder uncon-
ditionally, can form no ingredient in
the vendee's claim for damages for
breach of even a written contract in
which the assignment of such policy is
neither expressed nor implied.
As therefore the policy of insurance
cannot enter into the question, neither
vendor nor vendee canobtain any com-
pensation f6r -any depreciation in the
value of the property on the one hand,
or the loss of the bargain on the other,
where there is no taint of fraud to viti-
ate the contract. The principle that
governs is that of mutuality. The value
of the land is not the measure of dam-
ages, but the amount of the considera-
tion.
11 If under the pressure of heavy dam-
ages the party could, in such cases, be
deprived of what is called the locus
penitenti, and on the one hand, be
compelled to convey, or on the other
to accept of the purchase by having
damages against him to the amount of
the contract, according as the jury may
view the circumstances of the case, the
distinction would then be without a dif-
ference, and the absence of the 4th sec-
tion of the statute of Charles a serious
inconvenience:" 1 Smith's Laws, p.
397.
Numerous English cases have been
decided in the same way, where the
consideration is executory as well as
wherd it is executed: Fureau v.
Thornhill, 2 W. Blk. 1078; Walker v.
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Constable, 1 Bo. & Pul. 306 ; Johnson
v. Johnson, 3 Id. 162; Valker v.
Moore, 10 B. & 0. 416 ; J7annain v.
Egelstone, 5 0. & P. 172. "The
vendee must pay the consideration al-
though the estate itself be destroyed
between the agreement and conveyance ;
and on the other hand he will be en-
titled to any benefit which may arise to
the estate in the interim: Sugden V. &
P. 446 (Am. ed.); 2 Pow. Con. 61;
Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. Wims. 220,; Bacon
v. Simpson, 3 U'. & W. 78; UcKechnie
v. Sterling, 48 Barb. 330; Robb v. Mann,
11 Penn. St. 300; Reed v. Lukens, 44
Id. 200 ; Bill v. Cumberland Valley Mu-
tual Protection Co., 59 Id. 474. But see
Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134, contra,
and Blew v..McClelland, 29 Mlo. 304, also
contra, so far, at least, as the recovery
of the consideration was concerned, the
destruction having occurred previous to
the execution of a deed. The opposite
or former doctrine, however, bears the
impress and prestige of antiquity. See
Hunter v. Wilson and Acdson v. Dik-
son, vol. 2, of Coll. of Decis., p. 56.
At all events there is no authority for
the vendee's unconditional claim to the
insurance money.
In Loft v. Dennis, 1 E. & E. 474, an
action for use and occupation, Lord
C rUPnaL,, C. J., said: "I cannot see
why the fact of the landlord having re-
ceived the insurance money, entitles the
tenant to be relieved from his liability
for rent, any more than if the landlord
had won that amount in a lottery; there
is no privity in either case between the
defendant and the party from whom the
money comes."
This decision had been anticipated in
Leeds v. Chatham, I Sim. 146, where
the tenant had covenanted to repair. It
was held that a tenant has no equity to
compel his landlord to apply insurance
moneys received by him on the destruc-
tion of the demised buildings in rebuild-
ing, or to restrain the collection of rent
until the same are so applied. The court
said: "The plaintiff might have pro-
vided in the lease for a suspension of the
rent in the case of accident by fire; bur
not having done so, a court of equity
cannot supply that provision which he
has omitted to make for himself." The
court added, although there was a sur-
plus: "upon what principle can it be
that the plaintiff's situation is to be
changed by that precaution on the part
of the defendant, with which the plain-
tiff had nothing whatever to do ?"
These- two cases are cited in the ar-
gument in Seets v. Selden, 7 Wall.
416-24.
The same doctrine was enunciated in
Bussman v. Ganster, 72 Penn. St. 285;
also in Magaw v. Lambert, 3 Penn. St.
444, the court saying: "It was not the
rent which was insured, but the premises
out of which it issued: and the tenant
could not say that the company had paid
it for him..'
So, by analogy, as between vendor
and vendee, it is not the consideration
or purchase-money which is insured, but
the premises for which the consideration
is paid or agreed to be paid, and tic
vendee could not say that the company
had paid it for him.
In Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 itans.
674, however, it has been recently held
that, where real and personal property
are leased by a single instrument for an
amount in gross, and the personalty is a
substantial part of the property leased,
its destruction, without the fault of the
lessee, by fire or otlerwite, entitles the
lessee to an apportionment of the rent;
but the insurance, nevertheless, existed
for the benefit of the landlord.
The court also doubts, after a careful
consideration, whether what is admitted
to be the common-law doctrine, that the
lessee is bound for the rent in spite of
the destruction of the buildings by fire,
is in force in Kansas, but put its de-
cision on other grounds.
In the measure of damages for breach
of contract upon sale of goods, the an-
